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I was invited to examine the macroeconomic policy of  1973-75,  but 
limiting the analysis to those years runs the risk that the major lessons 
of  this period will be lost. Since the events of  1973-75  cannot be under- 
stood without reference to the highly expansionary policies of  1972 and 
the disruptive  impact of  the wage-price controls introduced  in  August 
1971, I have taken the liberty of  redefining my topic. 
The  controversy  over  policy  in  this  period  centers  on  monetary 
policy  in  1974.  In  the  first  major  section  of  the paper  I sketch  the 
policy activists’ position  on this controversy-the  position that the oil 
price shock should have been accommodated by extra monetary expan- 
sion. The next section of  the paper contains three subsections in which 
I provide my thoughts on the monetary, fiscal, and price control policies 
of  the 1971-75  period. The final section contains some general observa- 
tions on the lessons of  the period. 
The Activists’ View of  1973-75 
Since this paper  might have carried the title,  “The Case against the 
Case against Macro Policy in  1973-75,”  I might as well begin my dis- 
cussion by  outlining what  I understand  to be the typical  activist posi- 
tion on macroeconomic policy for 1973-75.  Hoping to use a reasonably 
neutral and descriptive term, I have called this position “activist” rather 
than  “conventional”  or  “Keynesian,”  but  a  case  might  be  made  for 
these other terms. 
This paper was half  completed when I read the paper by Robert Lucas prepared 
for this conference. The Lucas paper has certainly helped me to clarify my thinking 
about the lessons to be learned from the  1971-75  experience. 
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In any event, the dispute centers on policy, and especially monetary 
policy, in the first half  of  1974. The activists’ view is that policy was far 
too tight at that time. Using the most recently revised quarterly average 
data, MI and M2 growth rates from 1973:IV  to 1974:II were 5.9% and 
8.5%, respective1y.l The monthly average federal funds rate was pushed 
from 8.97% in February 1974 to 12.92% in July 1974. While the change 
in the federal funds rate was large, and the July 1974 peak was historically 
high, the M1 and M2 growth rates in the first half of  1974 were not low 
by long-term historical norms and were essentially unchanged from their 
respective growth rates over the preceding year. 
The argument that money growth in early  1974 reflected a very tight 
monetary policy depends on the observation that growth in real balances 
was abnormally low. With the GNP deflator rising at a 9.5% rate from 
1973:IV to 1974:II real M1 growth was -3.6%  and real M2 growth 
was -1  % .  The policy significance of  this observation, however, depends 
on the assertion that the inflation of  the period was largely exogenously 
determined by  supply shocks; the  rising price of  oil was not offset by 
declines in other prices because in the short run many prices are down- 
wardly rigid. If  this view is  accepted, then it appears to follow without 
further argument that nominal money growth was too low in early 1974. 
The Federal  Reserve,  on this  argument, should have adjusted upward 
the rate of  growth of  nominal money balances to maintain at least some 
growth in real balances. 
While I do not  accept the view that the price level can be taken as 
exogenous for policy purposes  and will discuss the  issue below,  at this 
point  it is  worth  noting that the logic of  the activist  position  requires 
indictment of  monetary policy in  1972. At the same time price controls 
were  exogenously  forcing down  the  rate  of  inflation,  nominal  money 
growth was accelerating. From 1971:IV to 1972:IV, M1 and M2 grew 
at 8% and 10.6%  rates, respectively, while the GNP deflator grew at a 
4.1%  rate.  The economy  expanded  excessively rapidly,  and  in  early 
1973 the  unemployment  rate  dropped  below  5%. The 1972 controls 
price shock should have been accommodated by lower money growth. 
While most activists do condemn  1972 monetary policy,  as I under- 
stand  their  position  the  magnitudes  involved  require  that  the greater 
criticism be applied to policy in  1974. In 1973 unemployment was only 
slightly less than  the natural  rate  and so excess demand  is  capable of 
explaining only a small part of  the 1973-74  acceleration  of  inflation- 
perhaps only half  of  one percentage point. Since controls are estimated 
to have reduced the price level to a point about 2% below what it other- 
1.  These  growth  rates,  along with  all  other  growth  rates  reported  below,  are 
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wise would have been at the end  of  1972,2 the breakdown  of  controls 
per se could account for at most a 4 percentage point acceleration in the 
inflation rate in  1973-two  percentage points of  return to the underly- 
ing inflation rate of  about  6%  plus  2  percentage  points  catch-up.  In 
addition, some extra inflation may have resulted from controls misman- 
agement. The off-again, on-again phases and freezes of  1973 generated 
some production  inefficiencies and some anticipatory price increases. 
In sketching the activists’ position  I hope I have not set up a straw 
man; I certainly have not intended to do so. This position does not re- 
quire that the inflation rate be completely insensitive to business condi- 
tions. Indeed, most of  those adhering to the activists’ position believe in 
a Phillips curve, although one that is fairly flat in the short run. The key 
feature of  this view is not that unemployment is irrelevant to inflation but 
that in  1973 and the first half  of  1974 unemployment was  so close to 
the natural rate that the acceleration of  inflation must be attributed pri- 
marily  to  exogenous  food,  fuel,  and  controls  mismanagement  supply 
shocks. 
Destabilization Policy 1971-75 
An  important  lesson from  1973-75,  I believe,  is  that  destabilizing 
policies really are destabilizing. This lesson cannot be understood by con- 
centrating on the period  1973-75  alone; the events of  1971-72  must be 
examined at the same time. Monetary  policy, fiscal policy, wage-price 
control  policies,  and  normal  business  cycle dynamics  interacted  with 
each other in a highly destabilizing manner. The supply shocks were of 
some importance but mostly because of  the controls. The nature of  these 
policies and their interactions will now be sketched. 
Monetary Policy. Over the period 1971-75  the money stock followed 
a classic destabilizing pattern. To avoid getting bogged down in numbers 
I will concentrate on M2, but the timing of  accelerations and decelera- 
tions of  M1 was broadly similar. 
After  growing at  a  trend  rate  slightly below  9% in  1970-71,  M2 
growth accelerated to a rate of  10.6% between  1971:IV and 1972:IV. 
This acceleration may be regarded as highly expansionary for three inter- 
related reasons. First, continuation of  the 9% rate of  M2 growth would 
have been consistent with a cyclical recovery. The rate of  inflation was 
gradually creeping down before controls were imposed and would have 
continued  to do so had  controls not been  imposed. With the inflation 
2. Robert  J.  Gordon, “The  Response  of  Wages  and  Prices  to  the  First  TWO 
Years of  Controls,” in  Arthur  M.  Okun  and  George  L.  Perry,  eds.,  Brookings 
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rate creeping down, a 9% rate of  M2 growth already reflected a mone- 
tary policy consistent with rapid expansion in real output. 
Second, wage-price  controls  did,  I believe,  suppress inflation  for  a 
time. For a given rate of  nominal money growth, the suppression of  in- 
flation generated  larger  real  money  growth  and, therefore,  tended  to 
stimulate real output growth. And third, nominal M2 growth did not re- 
main at 9% but accelerated to 10.6%. With the GNP deflator rising at 
a 4.1%  rate between  1971:IV and  1972:IV, real M2 balances grew at 
a 6.5%  rate over this period. 
The acceleration of  money growth in 1972 was clearly a mistake-as  I 
believe  most  policy  analysts  will  agree.  But  it  should  be understood 
that this mistake  was  partly  caused  by  the introduction of  wage-price 
controls in  1971. The Federal Reserve was under considerable political 
pressure not to “scuttle prosperity” through tight money, especially after 
price control policies were introduced to solve the inflation problem. In 
addition, as I have argued el~ewhere,~  the Federal Reserve was concerned 
that holding money growth  down  would  require interest rate increases 
that  would  undermine  political  support  for  “tough”  wage  and  price 
standards. 
Following its  1972 acceleration, M2 growth returned  to a rate only 
slightly below its 1970-71  rate-8.5%  from 1972:IV to 1974:II. This 
lower rate collided unavoidably with the price and output effects of  the 
1972 acceleration. Real balances in early 1973 were above those desired 
in equilibrium. An attempt to maintain the higher real balances through 
higher  growth in  nominal  balances would  have led  to an even greater 
acceleration in inflation. 
This view, of  course, is disputed by those who argue that the evidence 
from Phillips  curve studies  indicates that unemployment  was not  low 
enough to cause a substantial acceleration in inflation. But it is impossi- 
ble for the usual Phillips curve approach to deal adequately with chang- 
ing inflation expectations.  Surely, if  ever there was  a time when a sub- 
stantial  outward  shift in  the  Phillips  curve  occurred  because of  rising 
expectations of  inflation, then that time would be  1973. The transition 
from Phase I1 to Phase I11 was widely interpreted as a relaxation of  con- 
trols, and controls were in any event breaking down in many  areas be- 
cause of  growing shortages of  goods. 
While very little is known at the empirical level about the dynamics of 
adjustment, I believe that some degree of  overadjustment in the price 
level is quite likely. As inflation in  1973 worked down the level of  real 
balances, inflation also served to reduce the desired level of  real balances 
by raising the cost of  holding money. Given the path of  nominal money 
3.  William Poole, “Burnsian Monetary Policy:  Eight Years of  Progress?” Jour- 
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balances, inflation was partly self-generating for a time. But the process, 
while oscillatory, was not unstable; eventually the price level increased 
to the point where excess real balances were eliminated. 
As real balances were further reduced by inflation in 1974, aggregate 
demand weakened. This process was then aggravated by the unambigu- 
ous monetary policy mistake of  permitting a sharp decleration in money 
growth in  the second half  of  1974. Between  1974:II and  1975:I, M2 
growth averaged 6.2%  annual rate. Without this deceleration the reces- 
sion would not have been quite as bad as it was, but it seems unlikely 
that the recession profile would have been  much different if  8.5%  M2 
growth had been maintained. 
Fiscal Policy. Fiscal policy from 1971 through 1974 was destabilizing 
although, in my opinion, of  much less quantitative importance than mone- 
tary policy. As estimated by  the Federal Reserve Bank of  Saint Louis, 
the high employment budget deficit was $7.8 billion in 1971. During the 
boom year of  1972 the high employment deficit was $15.5 billion. As the 
rate of  growth of  real output fell in 1973 and became negative in 1974, 
the high employment budget  deficit fell to  $4.6 billion in  1973 and in 
1974 turned  into  a  surplus  of  $1.1 billion.  Fiscal policy provided  no 
stimulus during the contraction phase of  the business cycle, although it 
did turn expansionary at about the time of  the recession trough in 1975. 
Many observers have noted that the major explanation for the con- 
tractionary  course of  fiscal policy in  1973-74  is the high  elasticity of 
federal revenues with respect to nominal income. Inflation-generated in- 
creases in nominal  income yielded continuing growth in real  tax reve- 
nues at rates above the growth in real GNP. 
Although  fiscal policy was operating as an automatic destabilizer in 
1973-74,  it  would  in  principle  have  been  possible  for  discretionary 
policy changes to offset the automatic destabilizers. But in the inflationary 
environment of  1973-74,  tax cuts seemed out of  the question politically. 
This observation makes clear the importance of  designing a fiscal policy 
structure with desirable operating properties-a  structure involving auto- 
matic stabilizers. The key fiscal policy lesson from this experience is the 
importance of  indexing the tax system. 
Wage-Price Controls. The macroeconomic effects of  wage-price con- 
trols are, I believe, generally underestimated.  There are certainly many 
stories about inefficiencies caused by the last set of  controls-new  apart- 
ments sitting idle for many  months because  of  controls-induced  short- 
ages of  plumbing fixtures, and so forth. It is, I suspect, no accident that 
productivity  growth was  subnormal, even  adjusted  for normal  cyclical 
patterns, in  1973-75.4 
4.  See George L. Perry, “Potential Output and Productivity,” in Arthur M. Okun 
and George L. Perry, eds., Brookings Papers on Economic Activity  1977, 1 :  11-47, 
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Analysis of  controls is of  great importance in assessing the argument 
for monetary accommodation of  the “oil shock.” It is crystal clear that 
price  controls and  quantity  allocations  magnified the problems  caused 
by the OPEC price increases  and the oil embargo. Few will forget the 
disruptions  caused  by  the  unavailability  of  gasoline  in  the  winter  of 
1973/74, but a few numbers will serve to indicate the magnitude of  the 
regulatory disaster. 
First, when the embargo began in October  1973, the U.S. petroleum 
industry had  already been  disrupted  by  controls and spot shortages of 
petroleum  products  had  appeared.  Total inventories  of  crude  oil  and 
petroleum  products  had  declined by  3%  in  the  12 months  ending 5 
October,  1973. The embargo ended in mid-March  1974, but, because of 
the regulatory fiasco, inventories had been accumulated rather than run 
down during the embargo. At the end of  March  1974 total inventories 
were  6%  above  their  levels  a  year  earlier;  gasoline  inventories  were 
about 7%  higher while distillate fuel oil inventories were almost 20% 
higher. While price indexes for petroleum  products in this period were 
probably lower than they  otherwise would have  been  by  virtue  of  the 
oil price controls, the disruption  of  the production  process must surely 
have raised the prices of  other goods. Without price controls the erosion 
of  real balances in the first half of  1974 might have been ~maller.~ 
The disruption argument is reinforced by the fact that industrial pro- 
duction  reached  a peak in November  1973 and then declined substan- 
tially in each of  the next three months. This output decline cannot possi- 
bly be attributed to a decline in real money balances; if  the numerator 
of  real balances  had  declined  rather  than  the denominator increasing, 
no one would have predicted that industrial production would start fall- 
ing with a one-month lag. 
Without  relaxation  of  controls  monetary  accommodation  of  the oil 
price shock would have been less successful than the activists’ position 
might suggest, even accepting the assumptions of  that position. During 
the embargo larger aggregate demand would have increased the size of 
the  petroleum  products  shortage  and,  presumably,  the  shortages  of 
goods  whose production  is  heavily  dependent on  petroleum  products. 
Thus,  more  of  any  nominal  aggregate  demand  stimulus  would  have 
been  dissipated in price  increases than  relationships  estimated in  non- 
control environments might predict. 
After  the  embargo,  assuming continuation  of  price  controls on do- 
mestic  crude  and  petroleum  products,  stimulus  to  aggregate  demand 
through  extra monetary  expansion would  also have been  dissipated in 
5. The inventory figures in this paragraph are from Richard B. Mancke, Squeak- 
ing By: US.  Energy Policy  Since the Embargo  (New York:  Columbia  University 
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price increases to an unusual extent. With the price of  domestic crude 
controlled but the prices of  labor and other inputs to crude oil produc- 
tion not controlled, and with a growing gap between the controlled price 
of  “old” oil and the expected future price of  oil, demand stimulus would 
have tended to reduce domestic crude production further. To the extent 
that aggregate output rose the extra petroleum demand would have been 
satisfied  by  extra  imports.  These  two  extra  sources  of  demand  for 
petroleum imports would have made the foreign exchange value of  the 
dollar  depreciate  more rapidly  and  would,  therefore,  have  quickly in- 
creased the prices of  many tradable goods. 
The 1973-74  experience shows that price  controls can leave an in- 
dustry  highly  vulnerable  to disturbances.  While this point  may be dis- 
puted  by  price  control  advocates who insist that the problem was not 
with controls per se but with their administration, I believe that admin- 
istration  of  coiltrols  by  a  competent  independent  agency would  have 
caused basically the same problem.  The  1960s guideposts were justified 
in part  by  the  argument  that  they  would  help to prevent  “premature 
inflation”-price  increases that occurred before capacity production was 
attained. The U.S. oil embargo experience provides  a clear example of 
the benefits of  firms maintaining some margin of  excess capacity, excess 
capacity that could not exist with controls under the premature inflation 
doctrine. 
Whatever the merits of  my  analysis of  the probable performance of 
an  independent  controls  agency,  experience  with  price  controls in oil 
and many other industries demonstrates that controls cannot be kept out 
of the political process  and that  the political process does not produce 
even remotely  sensible controls decisions. Controls  are futile  and  dis- 
ruptive,  period.  And  they  spill over  to  affect traditional  stabilization 
policies  as  my  earlier  comments  on Federal  Reserve  efforts  to limit 
interest rate increases in 1972 pointed out. 
Some General Comments on 1971-75 
I  have  insisted  on  discussing the  period  1971-75  rather  than  just 
1973-75  because the problems of  the later years cannot be understood 
without reference to the earlier years. The entire period is especially in- 
teresting because  it  shows how policy was constrained in  1973-75  by 
policies followed  in  1971-72  and  earlier  and  by  market  expectations 
concerning future policies. 
The  1973-74  experience  with  fiscal  policy  is  helpful  in  explaining 
a poorly  understood  point  about monetary  policy. Although  monetary 
policy is supposed to be flexible, it is in fact subject to the same types of 
political constraints as fiscal policy. For a clear example of  these con- 
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in 1972  was politically motivated to help the reelection of  Richard Nixon. 
In the absence of  “smoking gun” evidence such a charge can be neither 
proved nor disproved and so is not a good subject for scholarly inquiry. 
What can be investigated, though, is the impact of  such charges on mone- 
tary policy. My distinct impression from following monetary policy over 
a period of  years is that Federal Reserve officials do feel constrained to 
follow policies  that “look  right”  to the public and the Congress. With 
respect to stabilization policy, the Fed probably  does have more room 
to  maneuver  than  Congress  has,  but  the  difference  should  not  be 
exaggerated. 
By concentrating on the analysis of  discretionary policy,  economists 
have neglected study of  the actual operating properties of  monetary and 
fiscal  policies  determined  importantly  by  feedback  from  the  political 
process and from the reactions of  those dealing in speculative markets. 
The recent  concentration  of  some economists  who  used  to be called 
“fiscalists” on discretionary monetary policy reflects, I suspect, a feeling 
that in the United States discretionary fiscal policy is a lost cause politi- 
cally. Thus, there is no point in criticizing fiscal policy for failing to off- 
set the oil price shock. But recognition of  the impossibility of well-timed 
discretionary fiscal policy, instead of  generating renewed interest in fiscal 
policy by  formula flexibility, has led  fiscalists to turn their  interest to 
discretionary monetary policy without  recognizing that the same issues 
arise in both policy areas. 
Fiscal policy can be used,  and has been used,  to pump up expendi- 
tures  and  cut taxes  in  an  election  year,  but  those  playing  the  game 
had better  play with  a certain  amount of  discretion. Somewhat higher 
political standards are demanded of  U.S. monetary policymakers, as the 
controversy  over  1972 policy  makes  clear. My  guess is  that at many 
points in time monetary policymakers have freedom roughly comparable 
to that of  election-year fiscal policymakers. 
The activists who  advocated  12%-15%  money  growth in the first 
half of  1974 are in the same political boat as those who advocate special 
tax rebates. No matter how sound the analysis, tax rebates payable on 
the Monday before the first Tuesday in November of  an even-numbered 
year just do not look right, and neither does a special, one-time dose of 
extra  money  growth when the  inflation  rate has hit  double-digits  and 
the unemployment  rate is about 5 % . A substantial increase in  money 
growth  in  early  1974 could  have  generated  political  charges that the 
Fed was trying to prop up a weakened Republican party before the fall 
elections; it could also have triggered sharp declines in the stock, bond, 
and foreign exchange markets as investors increasingly feared a further 
acceleration  of  inflation.  Such  events  would  have  forced  the  Federal 
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Experience with wage-price controls contains the same lesson. To the 
economist, nothing is more natural than to raise price ceilings whenever 
shortages develop, provided, of  course, that the control agency has in- 
vestigated the shortages and determined that they are not “artificial” or 
“contrived.”  But politically there is no question that the most difficult 
time to raise price ceilings is when there are shortages. 
In a democratic society the behavior of  all public officials is severely 
constrained  by  some  combination  of  explicit  legislation  and  implicit 
norms. Even policymakers with apparently unlimited discretion on paper 
are substantially constrained. The key feature of  the implicit norms rele- 
vant to discretionary policymaking is that the norms, like explicit legisla- 
tion, are determined in advance of  the events to which they apply pre- 
cisely so  that the policymaker  will  not be able to pursue personal ob- 
jectives inconsistent with his public responsibilities. 
Advocates of  discretionary policy have concentrated their analysis on 
uncovering  the  economic  structure  and  on  diagnosing  disturbances so 
that the optimal policy response can be calculated period by period. Al- 
though this analysis has suffered from the failure of  the models employed 
to handle rational expectations issues, model builders are acutely aware 
of  the need to improve their models and are constantly trying to do so. 
But advocates of  discretionary policy seem almost oblivious to the need 
to think about the analytical implications of  being forced by the political 
process to follow policy rules that sharply limit discretion. A simple ex- 
ample is that most advocates of  price controls would probably abandon 
the policy altogether if  told  that no price ceiling could be adjusted  by 
more than 6%  per year. 
Although  I  do  not  have  great  confidence  in  my  positive  political 
analysis because my “knowledge” consists of  nothing more than undocu- 
mented impressions,  I think I know something about the norms apply- 
ing to particular policies. In the policy area I know best-monetary  pol- 
icy-I  am convinced that a lack of  public  appreciation for the lags in 
monetary  effects  and  excessive  attention  to interest  rates  generates  a 
monetary policy that is naturally procyclical. Political norms do not by 
any means rule out policy responses to special events. In the monetary 
policy area there is a well-established class of  special events known  as 
“financial panics” under  which central banks not  only can  act but  are 
expected  to  act.  The Federal  Reserve’s response to the  Penn  Central 
failure in  1970 was certainly consistent with this implicit rule. A similar 
analysis  applies  to Federal Reserve  support  of  the Franklin  National 
Bank  in  1974, although  here the Fed  had  to be concerned  about the 
charge that it was bailing out the bank‘s owners and management at the 
public expense. The public correctly perceives that some public officials 
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class of  events subject to norms defining the appropriate policy response, 
policymakers will not be able to respond to such disturbances to the full 
extent indicated by “all available information.” 
I suspect that  a strong and politically astute Federal Reserve chair- 
man could break the procyclical pattern of  general monetary policy, but 
I have more confidence that a well-designed legislated policy rule could 
provide a permanent improvement than that we will be fortunate enough 
to have an endless string of  highly competent Federal Reserve chairmen. 
Given  the  vehemence with  which  so many  activists complained  about 
monetary policy in 1974, I am surprised that so few of  them share this 
view. 
The research  agenda implied by this discussion has two major items. 
At the level of  economic analysis per se there is need for examination of 
alternative policy rules. This item does not, or need not, reflect ideologi- 
cal  commitment  to rules  and  ideological opposition  to discretion but 
rather the empirical  proposition, which  is subject to investigation, that 
discretionary policy  in the United  States has been  subject to political 
processes that produce a suboptimal policy response pattern. 
The second item on the research agenda is an improved understanding 
of  the nature of  the policy response patterns generated by the political 
process. Positive analysis of  the political process is of  interest for its own 
sake but is also important for the economist as a policy adviser. One of 
the arguments against legislated policy rules has always been that it takes 
discretion to enact legislation, and discretion can repeal legislation. The 
argument is correct, but incomplete. Legislation does make a difference; 
laws  are  not  typically ignored  or abandoned  on  short notice.  Indeed, 
this  point  is  recognized  by  rules  opponents  who  argue  that  legislated 
rules will lock us into harmful and outmoded policies. The economist as 
policy adviser needs  to know  something about the political process so 
that he can propose rules that are consistent with it. 
If  asked  to speculate on the nature  of  the optimal  monetary  policy 
rule I would first emphasize that it is a mistake to approach the problem 
as one of  designing a rule expected to be optimal for all time. The oper- 
ation of  any rule is bound to generate evidence pointing toward modi- 
fication of  the rule.  In addition,  since public  attitudes change through 
education and experience, a desirable rule that is not politically feasible 
now may become so later. The policy problem is not that of  devising an 
optimal policy rule but rather that of  devising an improved rule that can 
evolve over time as evidence accumulates and public perceptions change. 
The events  of  1971-75  strengthen  the  case  for  adopting  a  steady 
growth monetary rule. Given the lack of  public understanding of  the lags 
in the effects of  monetary policy changes, a reactive rule designed with 
lags in mind seems unlikely to survive politically. While a steady growth 
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than a reactive rule that almost certainly will at times appear perverse to 
the layman. In addition, a reactive rule is clearly subject to opportunistic 
tampering since the evidence on the length of  the lags in policy effects is 
not strong enough-probably  because the lag process is not at all stable 
-clearly  to justify one particular reactive rule over another. 
The political question in the design of  policy rules is one of  feasibility 
in the fundamental rather than the partisan sense. Successful policy ad- 
visers have always operated with an intuitive feel for political processes, 
but  surely the methods of  social  science can add much to our under- 
standing. Multiple regressions and explicit policy rules will never replace 
the policy adviser who has brilliant political intuition but they will make 
it possible to pass along a certain amount of  knowledge from one gener- 
ation to the next. 
Comment  James L. Pierce 
Poole’s paper provides a thoughtful appraisal of  macroeconomic policies 
over  the years  1971-75.  Poole had  been  asked  to analyze the policy 
implications of  OPEC but concluded, quite correctly I believe, that the 
macroeconomic effects of  OPEC cannot be understood adequately with- 
out appraising the initial conditions for the macroeconomy prior to the 
formation of  the oil cartel. These initial  conditions can be appreciated 
only after examining the macroeconomic policies of  earlier years, which 
can hardly be viewed as exerting a stabilizing influence on the economy. 
The imposition of  price  controls  in  1971 and the highly expansionary 
monetary and fiscal policies that followed produced economic distortions 
and inflationary pressures that, in turn, led to the subsequent relaxation 
of  price  controls  and  rising  inflation.  The economy possessed  an  un- 
usually bad set of  initial conditions upon which were superimposed the 
quadrupling of  oil prices  in  1973. The surge of  inflation that followed 
produced  highly restrictive  monetary  and fiscal policies. The economy 
responded to the shocks-both  external and self-inflicted-by  producing 
the worst collapse of  real output since the  1930s. Poole concludes that 
matters had  gotten out of  hand and that political considerations helped 
to turn policy restrictive in 1974. He argues that a more steady monetary 
policy during the entire 1971-75  period would have been beneficial for 
the economy. 
In reaching  his  conclusions, Poole revives the old question of  rules 
versus authority in the execution of  monetary policy. He concludes that 
rules seem preferable to the kinds of  macroeconomic policies that have 
actually evolved. In the current context, the issues can be developed by 
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for  which  it  is  appropriate  and  desirable  for  policy  to  react?  Solow 
answers yes, the government should have moved to offset the aggregate 
demand effects of  OPEC. For him an activist policy is desirable. Poole is 
a  little  less  clear  on  the  answer  to the  question  but points  out that 
previous policy errors seriously affected the conditions in the economy 
upon which were superimposed the actions of  OPEC. Poole seems to be 
arguing that policymakers  cannot be trusted to pursue  activist policies. 
Political and other factors can prevent the appropriate activist policies 
from being pursued. 
The argument for rules to constrain the execution of  monetary policy 
has  been  made forcefully  and repeatedly  by  Milton Friedman. A  de- 
scription of  the kinds of  rules that might be applied are summarized in 
the paper by Lucas. There are two elements in the argument for rules. 
First, policymakers often cannot be trusted to do the right thing because 
of political and other noneconomic factors. Second, there is such ignor- 
ance of the true structure of  the economy that activist policy strategies 
produce economic consequences that are inferior to the consequences of 
pursuing a simple rule. There is ample evidence to support the first argu- 
ment.  The second  argument is more difficult to analyze, but  it can be 
shown for certain models with stochastic structures, under certain condi- 
tions, pursuit of  a rule can produce “optimal” policy. These results, how- 
ever, hold for well-behaved stochastic disturbances and have nothing to 
say about the kind of  shock produced by OPEC. There was no way to 
anticipate that  shock, but  once  it  occurred there  was  ample evidence 
that  it  produced  a  disturbance  to aggregate  demand  that could  have 
been  offset to a  degree by  more expansionary policy.  This is  Solow’s 
point.  To be sure, ignorance of  the exact effects of  expansionary policy 
would limit the extent of  the policy move, as would the political prob- 
lems discussed by Poole. But despite these limitations, pursuit of  a policy 
rule in the face of  OPEC-type shocks represents a very restrictive policy. 
It appears that the economy would have been better off  if  the Fed had 
moved  to offset part  of  the  decline in  aggregate demand that resulted 
from the increase in the price of  In my opinion it would have been 
desirable  and  politically  feasible  for the  Fed  to have pursued  such  a 
policy if it had announced what it was doing. In particular, it would have 
to explain that it was not “accommodating” the inflation but rather act- 
ing  to cushion  the  economy  from  the collapse  in  aggregate  demand 
that occurred in 1974. 
A  particularly  unfortunate  consequence  of  the  monetary  policy of 
1973-74  was  that  it  was extremely difficult for  private  agents  in the 
6. For  a discussion of  the  kinds of  policy responses that might have been ap- 
propriate see  Pierce and  Enzler, “The Effects  of  External  Inflationary Shocks,” 
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economy to figure out what the monetary policy strategy was.  It seems 
fair to say that these agents were surprised both by OPEC and by the 
monetary policy that followed it. Previous experience strongly suggested 
that monetary policy would have been accommodative in the sense that 
the  Fed would have limited the increases in the interest rates that ac- 
companied the surge of  inflation and scramble for credit.  Agents were 
surprised and often chagrined to learn that the Fed had changed the rules 
of  the game. Short-term interest  rates were  allowed to rise at unprece- 
dented speed. As a result, many agents got caught with the need to roll 
over short-term  liabilities  at rapidly rising cost while seeing the yields 
on their longer-term investments not rise in commensurate fashion. Tur- 
moil resulted, and at times it became extremely difficult for many firms 
to roll over their liabilities. The uncertainties and confusion about mone- 
tary policy interacted with the uncertainty and confusion stemming from 
OPEC, price decontrol, and all of  the other factors that were hitting the 
economy. During the episode, the policymakers, both fiscal and mone- 
tary, were either silent about their intentions or were issuing the kind of 
optimistic claptrap that one has come to expect from Washington. Thus, 
the  statements  from  policymakers  coupled  with  actual  policy  actions 
heightened uncertainty. 
During the period from late 1973 through late 1974, monetary policy 
was for  the  first  time  on  an M1 target.  That is to say, the Fed was 
actually trying to achieve an M1 growth of  6%  or less as opposed to 
just making public utterances  about money targets.  This shift in policy 
strategy  was  unprecedented  and  produced  many  surprises  in financial 
markets.  Solow’s  analysis  and  the  results  from  many  other  plausible 
models imply that a fixed target for money is inappropriate when external 
supply shocks occur.  It is  interesting that it was  in response to such a 
shock that the Fed decided to pursue an M1 strategy. Perhaps this shift 
makes  Friedman’s  point:  central  bankers  are  not  to  be  trusted.  A 
smoother policy as suggested by a rule would be preferable in many cases 
to the kinds of  policy we can apparently expect. 
But literal application of  a policy rule through law or constitutional 
amendment is likely asking society to perform a lobotomy on itself be- 
cause the patient will feel happier that way. Such radical procedures do 
not seem justified. It does seem justified to push for more orderly and 
predictable policies but to expect policy to cushion the effects of  external 
shocks. I believe that disclosure of  policy strategies and intentions is the 
best way to accomplish these ends. 
It  was  disappointing that  neither  Poole nor Solow really  addressed 
the basic issue raised by the proponents of  rational expectations. Private 
agents do attempt to interpret current policy and they attempt to antici- 
pate future policy. A  more  stable policy  is  a more predictable  policy 
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always “wrong” in a predictable  way, perhaps  agents could counteract 
at least some of  its effects. But unfortunately policy is often unpredict- 
able. A mildly “activist” policy would be unpredictable to the extent that 
shocks to which it responds are unpredictable. But if  agents could have 
a reasonable  expectation  that  policy would  at least  move in  the right 
direction following discrete and unusual events such as OPEC, the econ- 
omy would  almost certainly be better off  than by  slavishly following a 
fixed rule. 
General Discussion 
Benjamin Friedman said he would try to connect his discussion of  the 
Solow and Poole  papers  with  the  earlier discussion of  the  Lucas  and 
Fischer papers, during which it seemed generally agreed that monetary 
policy in  1974-75  was poor.  The growth rates of  money  (Ml) on an 
annual basis  (annual average M1, year over year) were 6.7%  in 1971, 
7.1% in 1972, 7.5% in 1973, 5.5% in 1974, 4.4%  in 1975. 
He suggested four possible reasons for arguing that policy in 1974-75 
was poor: 
1. The growth rate of  M1 was not moved to 4% quickly enough. 
2.  The growth rate of  M1 was moved to 4% too quickly. 
3. Because oil prices had risen substantially, it was a bad time to go 
4.  Policy erred by thinking in terms of  a 4% rule at all. 
Despite the agreement that policy was poor, Friedman sensed strong 
disagreement  about  why;  indeed,  some  people  who  criticized  policy 
seemed  reluctant  to  say  why.  Friedman  himself  preferred  the fourth 
answer:  he thought policy in the first half  of  1974 had been in error in 
allowing interest rates to rise so high. He dissented from the view that 
either policymakers or economists were  more  aware now  of  the need 
for caution  and  prudence  than  they  had  been  in the  1960s. William 
McChesney Martin was hardly incautious. What has changed is the base 
against which caution  is judged:  it used to be interest rate movements 
and it is now money growth. He thought a more prudent approach would 
recognize that both money growth and interest rates conveyed informa- 
tion to policymakers. 
Robert Hall noted that calculations made by him and Knut Mork, as 
well as work by Eckstein, suggested that OPEC was responsible for only 
a part of  the fall  in real  GNP in  1974 and  1975. For that reason he 
thought  that  a  small increase  in  unanticipated  money would have  ac- 
commodated the OPEC shock. Hall noted that there had in addition been 
a dramatic unexplained drop in productivity in 1974-75. A third reason 
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frequently given for the recession, the drop in inventory investment, was 
not well understood but could not be regarded as exogenous. 
Robert Gordon said that of  the 12% price rise in 1974, 6%  could be 
attributed to inherited expectations and excess demand, 1  % to food, 2% 
to energy, and 3% to the end of  controls. He felt that Solow had missed 
a key issue by not considering the sensitivity of  the real wage to aggre- 
gate demand.  The United Kingdom, Italy, Canada, and Sweden had all 
pursued  policies of  accommodation  in  1974 and  1975, real wages had 
not fallen at the time, and more severe recessions followed later. Switzer- 
land and West Germany had elected to take their medicine early. 
Alan Blinder  thought that 3.4%  would be a better  estimate  of  the 
effect of  energy price increases on the overall CPI. He added that close 
to 100% of  the acceleration  of  nonfood  and nonenergy inflation from 
February  to  October  of  1974 was  a  result  of  the  lifting of  controls. 
He agreed with Poole that controls were a bad idea and that economists 
should say so. But he disagreed with Poole’s view that economists should 
worry about political constraints on policy:  economists should advocate 
what they believe to be optimal policies. 
Phillip  Cagan agreed that  the direct  effects of  energy  and  oil price 
increases had been small but said that pursuing those increases through 
stages of  processing would account for 3/8  of  the price rise. He added that 
the difficulty of  measuring the size of  the shock made it difficult to know 
how much accommodation should have been provided. 
Robert Weintraub  also felt that the effects of  the oil price  increase 
were larger than Hall and others suggested. As a crude approximation, 
the increase in the price of  imported oil multiplied by the share of  such 
oil in GNP would account for a 4.4%  price rise. On the timing of  policy, 
he felt that  monetary  policy had been  particularly  poor  in late  1974, 
when  fiscal policy  was  also contractionary. Finally,  he remarked  that 
changes in monetary  policy  did  not require  constitutional  change:  the 
Fed  could  operate  by  following legislative rules,  or rules  of  its  own 
choosing. 
Frank Morris said it was not true that the Fed had started following a 
monetary  growth rule in late  1974. They had started in  1972 but had 
mistakenly thought the natural rate of  unemployment was between 4.5 % 
and 5% rather than  5.5%. By  1973 they were aware they had made a 
mistake. He thought monetary policy in  1973 had been reasonable,  al- 
though the food price rise was  a surprise. Monetary policy in the first 
half  of  1974 had been  satisfactory but  other conditions,  especially in- 
ventory overaccumulation, made the recession inevitable. Monetary pol- 
icy had erred in the second half  of  1974: the size of  the recession had 
been underestimated and monetary policy turned around too late. 
Robert  Solow said  that  zero  accommodation  was  not  necessarily  a 
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not  been  particularly  successful. He also  remarked  that policymakers 
pretend  to be constrained to get themselves off  the hook when policy 
is criticized. 
William  Poole  responded  that  he  still  did  not  believe  it useful  to 
recommend policy without regard for public attitudes. 